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FAITH AND AUTHENTICITY: 
KIERKEGAARD AND HEIDEGGER 
ON EXISTING IN 'CLOSEST CLOSENESS' 
TO THE NOTHING 
Travis O'Brian 
Heidegger accuses Christian faith of closing off any possible authentic rela-
tion to the nothingness of Dasein. But this paper aims to show how 
Kierkegaard's portrayal of faith in Works of Love is of a relation to a 'noth-
ingness' even more profound (groundless) than the 'relative' or 'inunanent' 
nothingness described in Heidegger's analysis of anxiety. My argument 
centres on the role of desire in the constitution of the self. Heidegger rejects 
desire as having any ontological import for Dasein. But Kierkegaard under-
stands faith to be a "transformation" of desire (eros) - a transformation in 
which the self relates to the nothing in a way that both demands a concrete 
ethics and provides a psychologically more plausible motivation to "bring 
death as close as possible" than does authenticity. 
In his essay An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger says "Anyone for 
whom the Bible is divine revelation has the answer to the question 'Why 
are there essents rather than nothing?' even before it is asked."1 Such a 
person thus either fails to ask "the question of all authentic questions"2 or, if 
the believer does ask it, then he must "suspend" or risk his faith in doing 
so. The implication is twofold. First, the philosopher's question, "why are 
there essents rather than nothing?" has a deep priority over the question of 
faith. Secondly, since for Heidegger faith is always faith in the god who 
first of all "is,"3 hence a being among beings, faith is thus a kind of com-
portment which closes one off from the anxious possibility of nothingness 
(as well as the philosophical questioning that arises from it). 
Consequently, as far as the analytic of Dasein is concerned, this means, 
above all, that the commitment of faith is, if it is one's first commitment, a 
form of inauthentic existence. 
Heidegger contrasts the "security" of faith4 with the "daring" of authen-
tic Dasein5 for the most part because he thinks that only authentic Dasein 
risks the possibility of the Nothing in a radical way. But I want to suggest 
here that Kierkegaard's understanding of the paradoxical centrality of love 
in the constitution of the self challenges us to a faith that not only meets 
Heidegger's own criteria for "authentic existence," but may in fact demand 
a more concentrated way of relating to the Nothing than that of which 
Dasein's own understanding (or: projection) is capable and, as a result, 
avoids the risk of abstraction to which authenticity falls prey. Along with 
this basic proposition, I will try to show why faith provides a better answer 
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than does authenticity to the question why one should choose to relate one-
self to oneself in terms of nothingness. 
The question of the meaning of authenticity is a massive one and already 
some of the limits of my discussion should be becoming apparent.6 What 
concerns me here is the purely existential question of Dasein's relation to 
the nothing and how existing Dasein is able to maintain itself in this rela-
tion. I am not, for one thing, concerned here with the ontological question 
of Dasein's being as "uncoveredness." Rather, the aspect of authenticity 
upon which I will focus is Dasein's relation to the nothing in terms of its 
own self-relation and correspondingly of the nothing in terms of self-under-
standing and ultimate possibility - in short, of authenticity defined as a pos-
sible mode of existing in what Heidegger calls the "closest closeness" (Die 
niichste Niihe) to death as a possibility.7 In Being and Time, Heidegger offers 
many different ways to consider the meaning of authentic Dasein's existen-
tiell relation to the nothing, such as "becoming guilty," or "wanting to have 
a conscience," or "a readiness for anxiety." But for the purposes of this 
paper, this notion of existing in "closest closeness" to the nothing is perhaps 
the clearest and best, if only because it refers more obviously to Heidegger's 
existential agenda than to his ontological one. 
The place to begin such a discussion would seem to be with a compari-
son of the experience of anxiety as presented by Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger. Indeed, anxiety is for both writers an experience within exis-
tence that brings the self to the most intimate region of itself. Anxiety is 
therefore shown as the experience which delivers the self over to itself, 
over to the nothingness of the self, hence as a kind of opportunity for a 
"transformation" or "modification" of the self's self-relation - out of an 
ignorance or forgetfulness, and toward the possibility of becoming oneself 
in truth. Furthermore, for both Kierkegaard and Heidegger the experience 
of anxiety reveals that becoming oneself means: to be essentially related to 
oneself as an impossibility, an impossibility which the self, if it is to become 
itself in truth, must then relate to as its "ownmost" possibility. Faith and 
authenticity are, each for its own proponent, the mode of existing in which 
the self maintains itself in this relation to its truth in the most passionate or 
resolute way. 
In order to conceptualize the fundamental difference between 
Heidegger's and Kierkegaard's analyses of anxiety, we therefore must 
examine how each treats these key concepts of "possibility" and "impossi-
bility" and determine how these relate to "nothingness." Formally speak-
ing, the term "possibility" operates in a similar, three-tiered manner in 
both. First, "possibility" refers to what Heidegger calls "ontic affairs," sim-
ply the possibility to be or to do this or that. Marriage, for example, is one 
such possibility that I have either chosen or got myself into. This more 
familiar use of the term will not be of central concern here. Secondly, the 
ontological significance of the term "possibility" begins by conceiving of 
the self as, in Kierkegaard's language, characterised by "being able," and in 
Heidegger's language as being the "potentiality for Being"B - both of which 
indicate an essential freedom. To exist authentically is to relate to oneself as 
a sheer being-possible, free to be one's own "end."9 Thirdly, "possibility" 
also signifies this" end," freedom's for what? Formally speaking, 
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Heidegger and Kierkegaard agree that freedom points toward a kind of 
"completion" of existence, a "being-whole," or "unity with oneself."l0 
The difference between the two thinkers becomes clearer when we tum 
to their respective definitions of "impossibility." Nevertheless, similarities 
enough remain even here. Both, for example, describe "impossibility" as 
inescapable finitude or radical "unfree dam" in which the self's ability to be 
itself comes to or is at an "end." Both furthermore describe existence as 
suffering this moment of unfreedom at two 'points:' behind, the self is sub-
ject to a moment of genetic inability in which it is "delivered over" to or 
"given" to itself to-be, a givenness which Heidegger calls Dasein's "thrown 
facticity" and for which Kierkegaard adopts the Hegelian terminology of 
"immediacy;" ahead, this suffering is spoken by each as the phenomenon of 
"death." Both, thus, conceive of existence as emerging out of and moving 
toward "nothing," a "nothingness" they interpret phenomenologically as 
that over which the self has no ability, that which the self cannot appropri-
ate for itself. 
For neither thinker, of course, does the "end" of all possibility, "death," 
denote merely the biological 'end' of life. But their fundamental disagree-
ment over what anxiety reveals to be constitutive structures of the self is 
highlighted by what each proposes to be the 'freest' response to this 
'unfreedom.' According to Being and Time, anxiety reveals that Dasein's 
possibility is impossibility: "death" indicates that Dasein's freedom (possi-
bility) is not for a certain, pre-determined possibility ('end'), but that free-
dom consists in Dasein's being-delivered-over to itself precisely as nothing 
to-be." For Heidegger, Dasein's "task," at least insofar as there is some-
thing like "authenticity" to be won, is to uncover its Being-possible for 
nothing; Dasein is the being that is able to understand or "project" itself as 
Being on the ground of a "nullity." Dasein is capable of its nothingness, able 
to stand-under the burden of its ownmost impossibility. 
But for Kierkegaard, in contrast, the self is, by itself, completely incapable 
of becoming adequate to itself, incapable, that is, of its 'being' (conceived as 
"unity with oneself"). Why the self is not capable of itself is a complex 
question that cannot be adequately addressed here, but it involves 
Kierkegaard's interpretation of "sin." Unlike Heidegger's analysis of 
"thrown fadicity," in Kierkegaard's view the self is not necessarily orient-
ed toward its telos; the self does not necessarily have its being as its "own-
most" concern. Rather, sin is a "leap" in which the self strives to take pos-
sibility into its own hands and, by doing so, to posit itself as the 'ground' 
and measuring task of existence. "Impossibility" means for Kierkegaard 
that the self is not able to achieve its "unitary" self; the self cannot appropri-
ate its origin ex nihilo and "death" is the final seal of this end of possibility, 
for death comes between the self and its self-posited telos. 
According to Kierkegaard, therefore, there is a constitutional break in the 
self; the self cannot relate itself to itself (to its possibility) in a direct way. 
Kierkegaard's language of the "leap of passion" indicates just this: the self 
must first of all relate to impossibility (nothingness) as the only possible site 
for a resurrection of possibility (the "possibility for possibility"12). This fun-
damental and constantly recurring failure of the project of autonomy finds 
'positive' expression in Kierkegaard's famous formulation of the self as "a 
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derived, constituted relation ... which relates itself to itself and in relating 
itself to itself relates itself to another." Notice that whereas for Heidegger 
the self is capable of its "wholeness," so that Being-in-the-world/Being-for-
others does not mark a break in the self (this being exactly the point where-
at Levinas concentrates his criticism), for Kierkegaard the "another" refers 
to such an irrecoverable break - a moment of impossibility or passivity to 
which the self must relate, must strive to incorporate into itself, in the 
process of becoming itself. This active passivity, or passive activity, is love 
- which begins (in sin) as that kind of self-love which Kierkegaard calls pas-
sion, and which the tradition (both theological and philosophical) calls eros 
or desire. Passion is thus the self's existential drive to resolve the impossi-
bility (or nothingness) of itself by way of the (foreign) possibility that is 
dialectically inseparable from it. 
With this introduction to Kierkegaard's concept of eros, the central line 
of my argument begins to emerge. The difference between Kierkegaard 
and Heidegger's analyses of anxiety comes down to this: that whereas for 
Heidegger anxiety reveals that Dasein's possibility is impossibility, nothing 
further and nothing more, for Kierkegaard, in contrast, anxiety reveals a 
fundamental doubleness in the self - that the self can become conscious of 
itself as an impossibility only because it is equiprimordially given to itself 
as an ultimate possibility. For Kierkegaard, accordingly, passionate self-
awareness is, negatively speaking, the awareness of oneself as an impossi-
bility; but positively speaking, it is the awareness that this impossibility is 
indirectly possible, mediated by and "with the help of" another - and that 
love (and neither "projection" nor "understanding") is the 'medium' which 
makes this mediation possible. 
It safe to suppose that it is just because Heidegger does not discover a 
break in the circle of the self's relation to itself that he ignores 'love' or 
'desire' as having any structural significance for Dasein. But we must then 
tum our attention to this 'medium' as it operates in Kierkegaard's work. 
Passion, as he understands it, is the desire to solve the riddle of the self's 
impossibility. But Kierkegaard further defines "despair" as the self's 
attempt to solve this riddle by relating to 'otherness' within the pale of 
immanence alone - either by relating itself to itself aesthetically, ethically, 
or immanent-religiously. Each of these "stages" of existence may be 
defined in the 'existentiell' terms of how the self relates to itself by relating 
to others. The aesthetic individual relates himself abstractly to others, 
using others simply as occasions for his particular enjoyment and a means 
to escape ennui. The ethical self, on the other hand, relates to the other as 
an occasion to express the universal. According to Kierkegaard, the ethical 
personality does not treat others truly as ends-in-themselves because the 
ethical is still a matter of expressing one's own possibility; the ethical per-
son's relations to others remains in the context of a self-relation, that is, of 
an interest in becoming oneself.13 Lastly, the immanent-religious individual 
relates himself in resignation to others. From this perspective, no possible 
relation to another can have any ultimate (eternal) significance because the 
immanent-religious person, in guilt-consciousness, realizes the infinite 
depth of his impossibility. Consciousness of "guilt" is the consciousness 
tllat one cannot finally appropriate the nothingness of existence. But (and 
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this is where the immanent-religious differs from Heidegger's authentici-
ty), the immanent-religious self does not relate to itself quite as a sheer 
impossibility, for consciousness of the self's impossibility can be brought to 
light, as we have seen, only in dialectical relation to possibility. Therefore, 
although the immanent-religious individual is "now distanced from (his 
being-possible in any ultimate sense) as much as possible ... he still relates 
himself to it,"l4 for if he did not, he could not retain the consciousness of 
guilt by which he, the immanent-religious individual, relates himself to 
himself, defines himself. 
It is most important to note that all three of these (despairing) stages are 
characterized by self-love (passion, infinite self-interest).l5 In all three, every 
instance of relating to another is a means by which the self relates to itself, 
or is at least a reflection of this self-relation. Thus, if the self is not to exist 
in a state of despair, if the self in the passion of inwardness is to relate to 
itself in truth as an impossible possibility, then its self-love must undergo 
what Kierkegaard calls "the transformation of the etemal."l6 In this trans-
formation, the other is no longer related to in terms of what, in the vocabu-
lary of Works of Love, Kierkegaard calls personal inclination or "prefer-
ence." This means that the other is no longer related to self-referentially; 
the relationship is no longer an immediate reflection of the self's relation-
ship to itself. A beloved who is loved without such an immediate self-refer-
ence can only be, as we shall see, the neighbour. 
Before we begin to explore the meaning of this "transformation," we 
should return for a moment to Heidegger, from whose path, with this talk 
of love and desire, we seem to have wandered irrecoverably. I do not, in 
fact, believe the word" desire" appears even once in the whole of Being and 
Time. Nevertheless, at one point he hypothetically suggests that we may 
speak of the "not-yet" of Dasein in terms of Ausstand - of a lack in Dasein 
that is yet to be paid, a debt that is "still outstanding." His final rejection of 
such terminology we may take to be his official rejection of "desire" as an 
essential structure of existence. Heidegger tells us that "this being-missing 
(we can read: "lack") as still-outstanding (read: the debt that must be paid if 
one is to fill a constitutional lack in the self), cannot by any means define 
ontologically that 'not-yet' which belongs to Dasein." Why not? Because 
"Dasein does not have ... the kind of Being of something ready-to-hand-
within-the-world ... (Dasein's existence) is not constituted by a 'continu-
ing' piecing-on of entities which, somehow and somewhere, are ready-to-
hand in their own right."l7 In other words, Heidegger rejects desire as hav-
ing an essential role in the constitution of Dasein because he believes that 
the logic of desire is objectifying, makes an "object" of Dasein. As this 
quote implies, if Dasein desires, it must desire some-thing, ready-to-hand. 
But some-thing cannot satisfy Dasein's "not-yet," for Dasein's "not-yet" is 
not something that can be paid off in this way. 
Yet Heidegger does not reject the language of desire simply because no 
object can satisfy it - so far, the tradition is in agreement. He rejects such 
language rather because he believes it to be irremediably objectifying - in 
other words, inescapably linked to the philosophy of substance and the 
logic of "perfection." According to the tradition, desire begins in a lack. 
But according to Heidegger, there is no "lack" in Dasein. A lack presup-
FAITH AND AUTHENTICITY 77 
poses a fullness, just as a failure presupposes there is something to be won. 
But the whole effort of Being and Time, we know, is to reject this "some-
thing." Hence, Dasein's "not-yet" does not signal a failure in itself: 
Dasein's Being is "not-yet," nothing more. Dasein's only "fullness" or 
"perfection" is death; Dasein's "end," we have seen, is death. 
Are we forced, then, to agree that Kierkegaard's treatment of the self sim-
ply falls prey to Heidegger's criticism and rejection of the traditional cate-
gories? The remainder of this paper shall be taken up for the most part with 
considerations which I hope will prevent too hasty an assent. For I believe 
that Heidegger's sweeping rejection of the logos of desire, if it does not 
make the possibility of existence itself less conceivable, it at least makes the 
plausibility of Dasein's choosing itself in terms of authenticity less urgent, 
less forceful. Furthermore, a closer inspection of what Kierkegaard means 
by desire, and especially of what he calls "the transformation of desire by 
the eternal"18 (which we now unveil as "faith"), might, I suggest, both have 
rid Heidegger of some of his prejudice against a faith which exists in "clos-
est closeness" to the Nothing, and might also have helped to solve some of 
the difficulties involved in his notion of "becoming authentic." 
The first consideration then, asks why Dasein should choose the "modifi-
cation" of existence that is authenticity. The Nothing calls Dasein to 
authenticity in the phenomenon of conscience. But is "nothing" enough to 
elicit an authentic response? In other words, is the nothing which calls 
enough to evoke responsibility, even in the sense of Dasein's being-responsi-
ble for itself? Is it possible to be responsible to nothing? I wonder if this is 
not, anthropologically or psychologically at least, entirely incorrect. I won-
der whether it is not necessary for there to be another that one is responsi-
ble to for there to be a reason to be responsible even for oneself. 
Perhaps it is possible to argue that Heidegger here has the "nothing" 
function in a way similar to the way in which the "another" functions in 
Kierkegaard, at least in the sense that it is "other" than the Being of Dasein. 
Accordingly, there are commentators who speak of Dasein's "ontological 
obligation,"19 the full recognition and acceptance of which defines authen-
ticity. But not only can "obligation" here at best be meant metaphorically, 
but in a strange way Heidegger's nothing is not even "other" enough to 
take the place of Kierkegaard's "another" in this manner. For as is wit-
nessed by the expression "no-thing," Heidegger speaks of a nothing that is 
relative to Being, and relative even to the "there" of Being which is Dasein. 
The question, again, is whether nothing, and especially this "relative noth-
ing" (the Greek me on) is enough to summon Dasein to authenticity, or 
whether, if responsibility is never more than to oneself (and if assuming a 
self is even possible under such conditions - an assumption Kierkegaard 
refuses), there can be a satisfying answer to the question: Why be authen-
tic? Why should I choose to risk the pain and disorientation of anxiety 
when I can lead a full life involved in the community and busy with what-
ever task is at hand, with things that need doing? 
I am aware that many would argue that these concerns are misplaced 
because they are based upon anthropological or psychological considera-
tions. But if the ontological, existentialleyel does not accord with the exis-
tentiell, lived level - if, that is, what is demonstrated to be necessary in life 
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is not provided for on the structural level, we may then assume that the 
structural level as given by Heidegger remains, at the least, incomplete.21l 
At any rate, for the moment we must leave this as an open question to 
Heidegger. But that it remains a question is enough, for our purpose at 
least, to stay the Heideggerian criticism that this "another" which 
Kierkegaard includes in the structure of the self renders inauthentic the 
individual who orients his existence in terms of it. For such an "other" just 
may make authentic existence possible - or, if this thesis proves too strong, 
just may at least render authenticity of far more pressing exigency. 
Nevertheless, at this point I seem to have painted myself into an 
unnegotiable corner: somehow, I have managed to say that to exist in 
"closest closeness" to the nothing, it may be necessary to orient one's exis-
tence in terms of "another." Since, presumably, "another" is not nothing, 
does my argument not collapse into absurdity? Here we must turn to the 
crucial question and main thrust of my discussion: what is "faith" accord-
ing to Kierkegaard, and how does this faith permit us to exist both in "clos-
est closeness" to the nothing while, paradoxically, facing the radical 
"another" dwelling in the intimate self? 
As a prolegomena to the positive exposition of the meaning of faith in 
Kierkegaard, and in order to intercept a few potential misunderstandings, I 
should mention a couple of things which faith is not. First of all, faith is not 
an intellectual assent to a set of doctrines. This does not mean that 
Kierkegaard rejects the Church as an authority, but it is not to the church 
that the self relates when it relates itself to God in faith. Secondly and 
more importantly, faith is not a belief in some-thing that first of all "is" -
not, at least, in terms of a "what." Thus Kierkegaard says, "God himself is 
this: how one involves himself with Him .... In respect to God, the how is 
the what."21 Faith is this "how" one involves oneself with God (whose cor-
responding "what" we will discover below). In other words, Christianity 
is a striving.22 
How, then, goes this striving? How is faithful existence? Of the many 
formulations that Kierkegaard gives in answer to this question, I choose one 
as exemplary: the faithful individual is he whose passion takes the form of a 
Duty to be in the Debt of Love to Each Other.23 In the unpacking of this formu-
lation that follows, I ask only that the reader listen for the way in which the 
self, in faith, actively comports itself in a "closest closeness" to nothing. 
Our Duty To Be in the Debt of Love to Each Other 
According to the existential logic unfolded in the drama of the stages, the 
individual is prepared for genuine Christian faith only once he comes to 
understand, in guilt-consciousness, that he cannot provide himself with the 
condition wherein he could become adequate to himself. In guilt-con-
sciousness, as I have already explained, the individual comes to realize the 
impossibility of any final positive appropriation of the nothingness of the 
self into himself. The very structure of existence (understood by Anti-
Climacus as the state of sin) prevents him from achieving such adequation. 
It is only at this point, a point which Kierkegaard often describes in terms 
of a kind of mystic "dark night,"24 that the self is broken enough to accept, 
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in his need, that although he cannot give himself this condition, there is 
another, an impossible (paradoxical) other who can. To accept this condi-
tion, that one's ownmost possibility is possible only in relation to an 
impossible other, is to give the responsibility for self-adequation over to this 
other. The promise of final adequation is the incarnation of Jesus, the 
Christ, and faith is thus the passive activity of accepting the given promise 
and responding to it by giving one's passionate self-interest (read: existence) 
over to Him. This activity of 'handing over' is itself an abysmal striving, 
never complete. The existential, erotic striving for one's ownmost possibil-
ity is thus here transformed into a striving to empty oneself of this self-inter-
est (but, note, while remaining dialectically interested in it - for if one loses 
the interest, the motivation to empty oneself of it also vanishes) by giving it 
up to Him who is the last hope but also the promise of an eternal possibili-
ty (Salighed). This 'handing-over' is the "how" of faithful existence, and 
this "transformation" of existence (in distinction from the term "modifica-
tion" used by Heidegger) begins with the recognition of duty. 
What is duty? The kind of duty spoken of here is not the ethical duty to 
express the universal in one's existence - a duty which, we saw, does not 
escape the autonomy of self-interest. Rather, Christian duty is assumed as a 
"task" which does not originate within the self, but which, nevertheless, the 
self recognizes and appropriates Jar itself, as its "ownmost" task. In duty, 
therefore, a displacement of the autonomy of the self occurs?' In assuming 
Christian duty, the individual recognizes that his own possibility to-be is in 
fact not his own (or vice versa, what is not his own the self recognizes to be 
his ownmost). Thus the self (paradoxically, and thus by way of an uncertain 
leap) gives itself to itself by giving itself over to the authority of another. 
In the passion of faith, of recognizing the necessity of duty, the self is 
indeed set back in radical finitude. Faithful existence is far from relating 
oneself to oneself on the ground of a false security in being. Yet as we have 
seen, self-conscious finitude necessarily expresses a doubleness: both 
impossible and possible. In the passionate language of faith, the impossi-
bility is understood as the profound "I can't," the ultimate vanity of the self 
- that "before God, I am nothing."26 The possible, on the other hand, freedom, 
is transformed into the fortitude to maintain oneself in the call of duty. In 
faith then, what does duty call the self to hold itself into? Debt. It is our 
duty to be in debt. 
Striking. Here Kierkegaard is apparently advocating precisely that 
which we have seen Heidegger reject - that is, thinking of the nothing that 
anxiety brings to the surface of existence in terms of a debt to be paid, in 
terms of "something still outstanding." But there remains a difference nev-
ertheless. This difference does not lie in Kierkegaard's claim that the debt 
is an "infinite debt," for this claim, left merely as such, would not escape 
the objectifying logic of filling a lack, but would only defer the completion 
of the payment indefinitely. The difference rather lies in the fact that now, 
in its transformed mode, the self actually desires to be in debU7 We saw 
that Heidegger rejected the language of debt because according to him this 
language inevitably presupposes a philosophy of perfection and fulfill-
ment. But Kierkegaard turns this language on its head. The everyday or 
natural state of human being indeed exists in the hope of such fulfillment, 
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but as such, it is in a state of despair - despair because forgetful of, even 
fleeing from, the impossibility or nothingness of its existence.28 But faith, 
the "transformation" of this everyday state (which it thereby presupposes), 
does not seek perfection.29 Thus Kierkegaard emphatically does not say it 
is our duty to repay the debt, but to-be in it: the task of faithful existence is 
no longer to resolve the debt, but to maintain oneself in it. As such, the 
debt can no longer be conceived strictly as a debt (or lack) of being. 
One way to understand this is that, with the transformation of passion 
which is faith, the self no longer has its own being as its first "issue." Its 
being is no longer its ownmost concern. In the untransformed, purely 
immanent mode of existence, passion responds to the debt as a debt in the 
self's being and seeks to overcome it. But faith, the transformation of that 
passion, understands that the only way out of the debt is through the debt 
because only and precisely at the place of the break in the self, where the 
self discovers its impossibility, can the self begin to relate itself at the same 
time to an impossible (absurd) "possibility for possibility." The self there-
fore desires to stay in debt and not to resolve or repay it; passion is no 
longer directly and in the first place concern for the self's own being. On 
one level it remains this, of course, but only obliquely. Now one's own 
existence is no longer the 'direct' focus of one's concern. Rather, the 'goal' 
of self-interest breaks through the tyranny of the dilemma "to be or not to 
be" as the only two possible options. 
When the self desires to be in debt, then it no longer relates to the debt as 
a debt of being, but rather as a debt of love. Already situated self-under-
standingly in the ultimate relativity of being/nothing, when the self in 
faith desires to be in debt, it no longer relates itself to itself as something to 
become; the source of the restlessness of existence it now understands in 
terms other than a lack of being. The transformation of desire thus lifts 
desire out of the logic of fulfillment (perfection) so that it henceforth strives 
to express a relation to a more fundamental abyss. And with this we have 
discovered "what" God is, according to Kierkegaard, in terms of "how" we 
relate to Him: we relate to God as nothing, the abyss of love. 3D 
Furthermore, we venture to say that this "nothing" is a more abysmal 
nothing than that of which Heidegger speaks because it does not focus on 
the "to be or not to be." The nothing here is not relative to being. It is, 
rather, the Greek ouk on, to which theology refers in the ex nihilo of 
creation.3! (God is the afgrund whose self-generated Word loves creation 
into life and death.) 
To love God in faith is to actively take up nothing as the task of exis-
tence. But if this is so, can we conceive of love as anything more than a 
pure abstraction? The quote we are now investigating does not equivo-
cate; the activity of love cannot be more concrete: it is our Duty To Be in the 
Debt of Love to Each Other. In this lito each other" we hear the command 
to love your neighbour. Thus when Kierkegaard says that the faithful self 
strives to give its existence away to another, the other who is to receive this 
"gift" of the self is not directly God. God is not a tyrant who demands our 
existence from us; "God," says Kierkegaard, "demands nothing for himself, 
although he demands everything from yoU."32 We give everything away, 
become as nothing before God, when we give everything to the neighbour. 
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The neighbour, unlike the friend or romantic beloved, is not marked by 
anything" distinctive." Without distinction, love for him is not the love of 
self-referential preference, but can only be called forth in obedient response 
to the duty to love. Thus, the transformation of passion is not in the least 
abstract. A command usurps the place of natural, spontaneous inclination 
and gives to duty its specific task: to love one's neighbour. 
Now, at last having traced this strange, round-a-bout logic, we can con-
clude. The self in passion for its own impossible possibility to-be, 
renounces this concern by taking up the task of becoming nothing - not in 
a mystic retreat, but by venturing out again amongst beings - those beings 
called "neighbours." Faith, according to Kierkegaard, is to truthfully exist 
in "closest closeness" to the nothing. To "relate oneself to God," he says, 
"is to become as nothing."33 Herein we see why Kierkegaard's description 
of faith provides a psychologically more plausible motivation to suffer an 
existence bound in the closest possible relation to nothingness than 
Heidegger's description of authenticity (and Kierkegaard, unlike 
Heidegger, makes no bones about the fact that such an existence, from a 
natural, everyday perspective, is suffering) precisely because to suffer this 
way is to respond to God in one's need - or more precisely, is to respond to 
the saving invitation of Christ, to become responsible to him. 
Furthermore, not only is the "nothing" to which the faithful individual 
relates a more abysmal nothing than that to which Heidegger refers, 
Kierkegaard has shown how existing in such "closest closeness" is the most 
concrete of tasks. For love of one's neighbour is not a feeling, not a "soul 
mood," but true love, he says, "is pure action."34 For this very reason, the 
"transformation" of existence that is faith does not suffer from the danger to 
which the "modification" of authenticity is prone - the danger of being 
overly vague, abstract. Authenticity, in the end, is merely a modification of 
the understanding, perhaps a kind of more intense vision given in an inti-
mate rapport with the fragility of Being. But as Patricia Huntington has 
asked, "Where does authentic resolve deliver me? ... Heeding the call of 
conscience proves empty .... This 'moment of vision' is purely formal, 
abstract, 'indefinite'."35 
If Heidegger had not been blinded by his preoccupation with sweeping 
the whole tradition away as "onto-theology," I wonder if he then might 
have been more open to that part of the Christian tradition which does not 
conceive of God in the first place in terms of ''being'' - as the god which 
first of all "is." Perhaps he would then have been more open to the possi-
bility of faith as a mode of existing which relates to itself always in terms of 
its own nothing to-be.36 
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